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Introduction  
In 2004 and after the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities failed to agree 
reunification under a federal state, Cyprus entered the EU as a divided island. De 
facto, the EU member state is represented by the internationally recognized 
government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which is under the control of Greek-
Cypriots in the southern part of the island. The northern side, home to the Turkish-
Cypriot community and the self-declared state of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC), is considered a territory upon which the government of the RoC 
cannot exercise control and is, thus, exempted from EU law application, pending the 
reunification of the island. Despite the fact that Turkish-Cypriots are not part of the 
state that negotiated and succeeded EU accession, European integration has had a 
revealing impact on their domestic scene. Civil society in particular, is an aspect of 
domestic affairs that has been affected by European integration.  Before accession, 
EU integration was 'tied' to the prospects of a solution to the Cyprus issue via the 
United Nations (UN)- proposed ‘Annan Plan’, which envisaged the reunification of 
the country and its consequent EU entry. This EU-reunification linkage shaped the 
interests of the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, which supported EU 
accession in order to achieve their long-standing goal of reunifying Cyprus. At the 
same time, civil society gained domestic influence by leading a wider public pro-EU 
movement. After accession, the link between reunification and European integration 
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for the Turkish-Cypriots continues to exist and so does the associated effect of the 
EU on civil society (albeit mediated). What is more, the post-accession EU effort to 
promote the development of northern Cyprus has become a new channel of 
influence upon civil society. This article discusses this multifaceted impact of the EU 
on the Turkish-Cypriot civil society since 2002, which marks the birth of a strong civil 
pro-EU movement.  
 
This investigation is linked to the conceptual debate on Europeanization, which 
seeks to explain the EU's effect on states associated to the EU, such as member or 
candidate states. With Europeanization studies primarily concerned with 
conventional states, the Turkish-Cypriot case represents an idiomatic example of 
contested state. Here, we approach contested state as the entity that controls a 
territory (northern Cyprus) and has unilaterally declared state independence (as 
TRNC in 1983) but lacks full international diplomatic recognition1 (see also 
Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). Although Europeanization scholars have touched 
upon matters close to contested states (such as the related conflict or the relevance 
of the EU to the official state, from which the entity attempts secession), their explicit 
domestic scene and how it is impacted by the EU remains under-researched. This is 
the gap that the article addresses, by investigating the 'Europeanization’ of the 
Turkish-Cypriot domestic arena, and especially civil society. The argument advanced 
is that conditions of contested statehood, despite challenging the EU’s effectiveness 
on the ground, reinforce the occurrence of a Europeanization towards a more 
powerful, professional and EU-affiliated civil society. Subsequently, this research 
aspires to a two-fold comparative relevance: firstly, the Turkish-Cypriot case 
                                                        
1 The self-declaration of TRNC is condemned by UN Security Council Resolution 541(1983). 
3 
 
becomes a blueprint for the examination of the Europeanization of other contested 
states2 and the importance of their civil society. Secondly, this study has 
comparative value also for the broader relevance of the EU to civil society, especially 
in environments where the engagement with state authorities is challenging 
(regardless of statehood status per se). Indeed, the external relations of the EU often 
face politically challenging regimes and pay increased attention to civil society. As a 
result, the article contributes to the wider debate on Europeanization and the stimuli 
or limitations for the EU’s international role, especially in reference to dealings with 
civil society as an alternative to traditional EU-state relations.  
Research methodology is based on a single case study, linked to the debate on 
Europeanization. In the first part of this article, a critical review of the literature 
provides the conceptual framework for the following investigation of the case study, 
which is based on qualitative analysis of primary material, such as policy documents 
from the local and EU level (particularly EU regulations, their proposals and reports 
on their implementation) and international and local media reports. Research also 
draws on semi-structured interviews  with a representative sample of EU officials (7) 
and Members of the European Parliament (1), who focus on Turkish-Cypriots and 
civil society. Also, interviews with local political elites (3) provide background 
information but, more importantly, analysis draws on interviews with civil society, 
including: Trade Unions (2), leaders of pro-EU civil platforms (1), representatives of 
the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) both at the local (2) and 
European level (1). The interview questions focused on providing more detailed 
information on the EU programs and their impact but also unravelling how the EU 
                                                        
2 E.g. Kosovo, The Occupied Palestinian Territories, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia. 
4 
 
has impacted the interests and understanding of civil society, including some of the 
interviewees.  
 
Europeanization: Explaining Change beyond the ‘State’ 
In exploring the relevance of the EU to the Turkish-Cypriot community and civil 
society3, this research engages with the conceptual discussion of Europeanization 
that mostly seeks to explain the process via which the EU impacts national scene, 
particularly of member states (Ladrech 1994, Börzel and Risse 2000, Goetz and Hix 
2001, Töller 2010) or candidates for EU membership (Lippert et al. 2001, Grabbe 
2001, Seldemeier 2011). Indeed, contested states, like the Turkish-Cypriot, have not 
been at the heart of this debate that has concentrated on conventional states, 
especially policy and institutional matters and less politics and civil society 
(Seldemeier 2011).  However, contested statehood represents an increasingly 
important matter of European affairs, not least due to the EU’s involvement in many 
regions with similar entities (e.g. Balkans, Caucasus). In particular, the troubled 
diplomatic status of those entities calls for an investigation of their non-state players, 
like civil society, and their place within European integration. Therefore, the 
examination of the Turkish-Cypriot example is a contribution to the existing literature 
and provides a blueprint for the study of the neglected topic of civil society, 
especially in contested states.  Indeed, the few works on regions with contested 
states have focused on the related conflict (Coppieters 2004, Williams 2004, Nodia 
2007, Tocci 2008, Secrieru 2011) or EU-supported state-building (e.g. Kosovo- see 
Bieber 2011, Börzel 2011). Cyprus too has attracted the attention of scholars but, 
                                                        
3 Here, civil society is approached as ‘a realm of social life – market exchanges, charitable groups, clubs and 
voluntary associations, independent churches and publishing houses – institutionally separated from territorial 
state institutions […] a term that both describes and anticipates a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally 
protected nongovernmental institutions’ (Keane 2009). 
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again, most studies address the impact of the EU on the conflict (Tocci and 
Kovziridze 2004, Zervakis 2002) or the RoC, which represents the government that 
has monopolized EU accession (Featherstone 2000, Sepos 2008).  
 
Since the self-declared TRNC is not recognised and EU law is suspended in 
northern Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots represent an idiomatic partner of Brussels but the 
relations between the two resemble a lot the experience of EU Enlargement: the 
EU’s relevance to the community has been based on a) the prospects for EU 
accession (through reunification) and b) the assistance towards preparation for 
future EU integration, through financial and technical aid. Along these lines, the 
analysis of the Turkish-Cypriot case largely draws on the ‘path’ of Europeanization 
literature that is concerned with the impact of EU accession. An important detail here 
is that Enlargement-driven Europeanization is better conceptualised as a ‘top-down’ 
process of change, whereby candidate states cannot affect EU decision-making. 
This is not so true with EU member states, where governments can ‘download’ but 
also ‘upload’ policies (Connolly 2008). Despite this power asymmetry in terms of 
policy issues, internal socio-political dynamics during the process of accession can 
also be studied in reference to ‘bottom-up’ processes of Europeanization, whereby 
actors use European integration in order to influence domestic affairs (Dyson and 
Goetz 2003, 20). Indeed, the focus of this work on civil society and its mobilization in 
favour of the EU aims to uncover the importance of domestic social actors and their 
contribution to a ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization. At the same time, the similarities 
between EU Enlargement policy and the post-accession strategy of Brussels in 
northern Cyprus also create expectations for a strong 'top-down' occurrence of 
Europeanization.  
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Since Europeanization is approached as a process of change, a lot of the discussion 
has focused on the mechanisms via which the EU's impact is channelled. Besides 
institutional compliance that relates more to polity and policy matters, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (2002) introduce two more mechanisms of Europeanization relevant to 
socio-political dynamics and the question of civil society: Europeanization via change 
of domestic opportunity structures and framing of domestic beliefs and expectations. 
In cases of change of opportunity structures, the EU is thought to provide players 
with the opportunity to ‘exit’ domestic constraints to pursue their interests through 
European structures. Redistribution of power can also take the form of various 
‘informational advantages’, which relate to a) the influence that actors enjoy due to 
their relevance to a particular matter, or, b) more opportunities for access to 
information via participation in EU affairs (Hix and Goetz 2001, 12).  Indeed, case 
studies have looked at the change of opportunity structures in relation to civil society, 
especially in the context of Enlargement and through assistance or chances for 
international involvement (Císař and Vráblíková 2010, Göksel and Güneş 2005, Pilat 
2007). Besides, the EU is often thought to have empowered civil society by assisting 
the legitimacy of their agenda and by becoming an 'ally' to their objectives (Göksel 
and Güneş 2005, Tocci 2005).  
On the other hand, framing of domestic beliefs and expectations, what we refer to as 
'cognitive Europeanization', relates to changes in the interests of actors but also 
‘formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and ways of doing 
things and shared beliefs and norms’ (Radaelli 2000, 4), also via processes of 
socialization (Schmidt 2001, 12; Börzel and Risse 2000, Pasquier 2005).  Indeed, the 
literature has reflected on the change in the interests of civil society and has 
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documented the participation of organisations in the debate over European 
integration (Beer and Flecker 1998, Della Porta and Caiani 2009), especially in 
candidate countries, where civil society has played a crucial role by advocating EU 
membership in the public sphere (Císař and Vráblíková 2010, Göksel and Güneş 
2005, Tocci 2005) and in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion of Europeanization. The investigation 
of Turkish-Cypriot civil society also takes into account how the ‘carrot’ of EU 
membership can facilitate strong Europeanization pressures, especially as far as 
cognitive matters and the public support of EU integration is concerned (Agh 1999). 
At the same time, the various EU Enlargement programs, which target the assistance 
of civil society, entail the potential for the communication of new styles and practises 
for the organisations. Here, analysis also draws on the so-called ‘goodness of fit’ 
thesis (Börzel and Risse 2000, Radaelli 2000, Cowles et al. 2001), which discusses 
how the incompatibility between EU and national level creates opportunities for the 
EU to impact domestic landscape. As the communist legacy of recently acceded 
countries (2004/7) presented an interesting example of how the ‘misfit’ between EU 
and national level facilitates domestic change, the comparative underdevelopment of 
the isolated Turkish-Cypriot community is also expected to shape the process of 
Europeanization.  
 
In this regard, the lens of Europeanization help unveil the EU's impact on the 
Turkish-Cypriot civil society, via the mechanisms of change of opportunity structures 
and cognitive changes. Here, the EU and its role represent the independent variable 
and the degree of effect on civil society the dependent variable of the case study. 
Research begins with the hypothesis that the EU has impacted Turkish-Cypriot 
community by a) a (re) distribution of power in favour of civil society and b) change in 
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the perceptions of interests and the communication of new styles and practises of 
organisation and action of civil society.  As far as mediating factors are concerned, 
the focus is on three issues that shape the process of Europeanization as an 
example of contested state: a. the existing conflict (Cyprus problem), b. the non-
recognition of the contested state (TRNC) and c. the consequent international 
isolation of the entity.  
 
 
EU and the Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society: Two Stories  
The development of Turkish-Cypriot civil society has always been linked to the 
trajectory of the 'Cyprus problem', the inter-communal dispute over the fate of the 
divided island: despite the establishment of the bi-communal RoC (1960), ongoing 
conflict led to the retirement of the Turkish-Cypriots from the state and the division of 
the island into a Greek-Cypriot (south areas) and a Turkish-Cypriot zone (north). 
This division was reinforced by the 1974 war and the self-declaration of TRNC 
(1983), which remains diplomatically and practically isolated, since the RoC (now 
controlled by the Greek-Cypriots) continues to be the only de jure administration in 
the island. This pending resolution of the island’s division introduces a crucial 
dichotomy in the Turkish-Cypriot community (including civil society): on one side, 
stand local elites and public opinion that are ‘moderate’ with regard to the prospects 
of a solution, support a federal Cyprus and are generally defined by conciliatory 
tactics towards the Greek-Cypriots. On the other side, the ‘hard-line’ camp of those 
that are less flexible about the formula of solution (e.g. co-federation instead of 
federation) and their views are often characterized by a certain degree of Turkish 
nationalism and loyalty to the self-declared TRNC. While political competition has 
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seen a wide range of both moderate and hard-line views (Kyris 2012), civil society 
has been traditionally dominated by moderate actors.  
 
The eldest segments of Turkish-Cypriot civil society are a number of 'moderate' trade 
unions, such as the Cyprus Turkish Teachers Trade Union (KTOS) or the Cyprus 
Turkish Civil Servants Trade Union (KTAMS). Ideologically positioned on the political 
left, those groups have been critical of the right-wing and ‘hard-line’ governing elites. 
The dissatisfaction with the normalization of the island's division during the 1970s 
(Doob 1986, Faustmann 2003) resulted in additional Turkish-Cypriot civil initiatives, 
such as the ‘New Cyprus Association’, which aimed at reconciliation with the Greek-
Cypriots but enjoyed limited longevity (Loizides 2007, 179). The 1990s witnessed a 
new trend of civil bi-communal reconciliation, which encompassed a wider range of 
interests, including the environment, education and the arts (Wolleh 2002, 
Anastasiou 2007, Loizos 2006). This signalled the emergence of a more diverse 
Turkish-Cypriot civil society and the establishment of various Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), which, however, remained enriched with a reconciliation 
‘flavour’.  
 
As a result, not only over-politicization but also underdevelopment are central 
characteristics of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society. Civil organizations have been 
almost exclusively preoccupied with the Cyprus issue, with moderate positions being 
particularly dominant. This is explained by both the left-leaning ideology of a good 
part of the organizations4 and the monopolization of government by hard-line elites, 
which prompted a civil opposition. All together however, the domination of the socio-
                                                        
4 Left has traditionally supported a compromised solution of the Cyprus issue (see also Kyris 2012).  
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political scene by governing elites suppressed the development of civil society. In 
addition, underdevelopment and lack of professionalization was caused by the 
prematurity of the Turkish-Cypriot socio-political system, the absence of legal 
framework to protect and promote civil society (Interview, EU official A’, Brussels 
2009) and the international isolation, which did not allow external narratives of 
organised civil society to penetrate northern Cyprus.  
 
A 'Common Vision': Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society and the EU before Accession 
 
Coming to the relevance of the EU, direct links between Brussels and Turkish-
Cypriot civil society did not exist before circa 2006. Nevertheless, the prospects of 
EU integration became the reason for a unique 'Europeanization' in northern Cyprus. 
Early in the accession process, the resolution of the inter-communal dispute was 
dropped as a condition for EU entry. In practise, this meant that Greek-Cypriots, who 
monopolised the RoC, secured their entry to the EU. On the other hand, Turkish-
Cypriots, outsiders to the RoC and under the self-declared TRNC, could only accede 
to the EU as part of a new, bi-communal state, which will solve the Cyprus problem 
by reunification and replace the RoC in the accession process. This linkage between 
resolution of the Cyprus problem and EU integration led to a remarkable 
'Europeanization' in the Turkish-Cypriot community, whereby moderate civil society 
passionately advocated EU accession and led a strong pro-solution/ EU movement.  
 
Indeed, the support of the EU brought many civil society organizations in collective 
action. The 'This Country is Ours' scheme (The Economist, 20 July 2000) 
concentrated a range of organizations, especially trade unions, and was the first to 
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strongly campaign in favour of reunification and EU integration and against the 
regime of the hard-line leader Rauf Denktaş, who opposed the Annan Plan. The 
‘Common Vision of the Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society’ (Kibris, 12 August 2002) was 
another platform with similar aims that was initiated by the KTTO and brought 
together 86 organizations. The declaration that founded the organisation  sheds light 
on the benefits that EU integration was correlated with:  
 
‘reaching a […] solution in Cyprus followed by EU membership [...] means 
investment, production, employment, science and technology, and social 
security [and] the end of our isolation from the rest of the world’ (Cyprus 
Protests Calendar 2010). 
 
Also indicative of a 'cognitive' Europeanization of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society 
through the advocacy of EU integration is the open letter that the ‘This Country is 
Ours’ group addressed to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:   
 
‘Turkish-Cypriots have been facing […] difficulties owing to 
international segregation […] it is the common desire of our 
organizations that a [...] federation [is] established and [...] is a member 
of the EU’ (Cyprus Protests Calendar 2010). 
 
As obvious from the above, the Cyprus problem became a strong facilitating factor in 
the process of Europeanization: in this era, moderate civil society reconfigured their 
interests towards more pro-EU attitudes because European integration was seen as 
the means to achieve resolution of the Cyprus issue by reunification. Indeed, the 
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then KTTO President and leader of ‘Common Vision’ has explained that NGOs saw 
the EU as a guarantor of a viable solution to the Cyprus issue, which will bring 
Turkish-Cypriot prosperity (Interview, Erel, Nicosia 2009). Also, the KTOEOS 
Secretary General explains that the association of EU prospects to the Annan Plan 
reinforced the European 'feelings' of his organization and other members of civil 
society (Interview, Ersalan, Nicosia 2009). What is more, this 'cognitive' change 
often took place in contrast to existing ideological profiles. Many organizations 
altered their previously eurosceptic agenda in order to accommodate the purpose of 
the EU. For example, according to the KTOS Secretary General (Interview, Elcil, 
Nicosia 2009), the organization was principally against the EU but they nevertheless 
embraced the goal of European integration, only because it served their other target 
of Cyprus' reunification. This profound change offers clear evidence of the extended 
'Europeanization' of interests of civil society and resembles previous examples 
(especially in the context of enlargement), whereby domestic civil society took a 
clear (often favourable) public stance towards the issue of European integration.  
 
At the same time, civil society gained ample domestic influence by organising the 
public pro-EU/ solution movement. Firstly, civil society prepared an extensive 
campaign and went 'door to door' (interview, KTTO Official, Brussels 2009) to inform 
people about the EU and the Annan Plan, which was about to be subject to 
referendums in both Cypriot communities. Not only the technical details of the UN 
Plan needed to be explained to the public but the Turkish-Cypriot absence from the 
accession process (topped with the international isolation) led to an additional lack of 
EU understanding. This Turkish-Cypriot knowledge gap was opportunely used by 
many organizations that became the main information source regarding solution and 
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European integration and tried to communicate the 'good face of the EU' (Interview, 
Erel, Nicosia 2009) to the locals. A noteworthy example is the ‘European Information 
Centre’, which was established under the aegis of the KTTO and inaugurated by the 
then European Commissioner for enlargement Günther Verheugen (European 
Commission 2002). In addition, civil society also organised rallies (BBC News, 14 
January 2003) that protested the hard-line regime.  
 
Through this organization of the pro-EU movement, the EU also caused a change in 
the domestic power equilibrium towards a more influential role of civil society. 
Indeed, the popularity that the rallies enjoyed (some estimates refer to more than a 
quarter of the community's population-BBC News, 14 January 2003) is indicative of 
the extensive public influence that civil society obtained via the advocacy of EU 
integration. Moreover, the overturn of the Turkish-Cypriot hard-line parties in favour 
of pro-solution/EU forces for the first time in history (elections 2003/2005-see Kyris 
2012) testifies to the influence that civil society achieved in domestic affairs. This 
Europeanization-triggered change of opportunity structures is even more remarkable 
in light of the previously weak role of civil society within a system dominated by 
governing elites. It is also significant due to the absence of bilateral relations 
between Brussels and the Turkish-Cypriots, which also suggest a more 'bottom-up' 
process of Europeanization, widely initiated by social actors instead of domestic 
governing or EU elites. Indeed, this is not too dissimilar to other Europeanization 
studies (not least some focusing on Turkey- Göksel and Güneş 2005, Tocci 2005) 
that have reflected on the way the EU empowers civil society, by becoming a 
'partner' in their goals. 
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A New Scene?: Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society and the EU After Accession    
In April 2004, the Annan Plan, although supported by the Turkish-Cypriots, was 
rejected by the Greek-Cypriots and Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided country, 
with EU law suspended in the north. To address this challenging situation, the EU 
developed closer ties with the Turkish-Cypriots in order to support socio-economic 
development and preparation for implementation of EU law in northern Cyprus, in the 
event of a reunification (European Council 2006).  Despite facing significant 
challenges, the EU’s endeavour creates important Europeanization pressures for the 
local civil society, in addition to the EU's impact related to the ongoing linkage 
between solution to the Cyprus problem and European integration prospects. In this 
regard, the post-accession impact of the EU is channelled not only through the 
'ticket' of European integration but also through the EU-Turkish-Cypriot relations and 
this is an important difference to the earlier phase of 'Europeanisation'.  The main EU 
instrument is the ‘Financial Aid Regulation (FAR)’ which relies heavily on TAIEX and 
inter alia aims to: 
 
‘benefit [...] representatives of civil society [and] reconciliation, 
confidence building measures’ (European Council 2006). 
 
The above linkage between assistance to civil society and reconciliation is reflective 
of the EU’s rhetoric about its commitment to a compromise between Greek-Cypriots 
and Turkish-Cypriots. So far, the most important scheme through which the EU has 
channelled its help has been the ‘Cypriot Civil Society in Action’ which aims to: 
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‘strengthen the role of civil society [..] as well as to promote the [...] 
development of trust, dialogue, co-operation and closer relationship 
between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities as an 
important step towards a solution to the Cyprus problem’ (European 
Commission 2008e, 2). 
 
More specifically, the scheme has aimed at supporting: 
a) reconciliation, by financing civil society projects for the cooperation between the 
two Cypriot communities,  
b) NGOs that promote reconciliation through research and  
c) the Turkish-Cypriot civil society in particular, by funding existing or newly 
established organizations.  
 
It is, therefore, obvious that Turkish-Cypriot civil society attracts increased attention 
and more than a third of the funds (39 per cent) are designed to exclusively support 
the Turkish-Cypriots (category c), in addition to their eligibility for bi-communal 
(category a) or research projects (category b). Moreover, the widening of Turkish-
Cypriot civil society becomes a prime EU objective through the support of new 
organizations (category c). Here, the Commission seems to favour Turkish-Cypriots 
over Greek-Cypriots also due to the limited opportunities provided to the former as a 
result of international isolation (Interview, EU Official B’, Brussels 2009).  In this 
context, the support of Turkish-Cypriot civil society is prioritised over the assistance 
in both communities and bi-communal reconciliation. For example, actors with 
entirely reconciliation-related activities represent only a minority within the group of 
beneficiaries, a group which is, anyway, dominated by Turkish-Cypriots. Indeed, this 
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aid 'echoes' other Europeanization studies that reflect on EU-provided opportunities, 
especially through means of assistance in the context of enlargement.   
 
Particularly important for technical assistance has been the ‘Civil Society Support 
Team’. The Support team was established in 2008 aiming to help the so-called 
‘capacity-building’ of civil society, which represents a central EU priority (European 
Commission 2009, 5). The Team organised training sessions and several 
campaigns to raise awareness of the role of civil society and also established the 
‘Advisory Council’ as a discussion forum for NGOs (Civil Society Support Team 
2009). In this regard, the EU's role has entailed strong elements of technical help, 
which is crucial for the Turkish-Cypriots. For example, because previous funding 
schemes (e.g. UN Development Programme) had been traditionally supervised by 
externals, the Support Team made an extra effort to increase capacity of the 
organizations that will allow them 'ownership' of the project (Interview, EU Official C’, 
Nicosia 2009).  
 
In Europeanization terms, this assistance is very important not only for the 
empowerment of civil society but also the cognitive pressures that withholds. Here, 
international isolation becomes a mediating factor that intensifies the degree of 
'misfit' between domestic civil society, which is underdeveloped and unfamiliar with 
ideas and practises beyond the Turkish-Cypriot space, and what the EU would like 
to promote. This misfit has facilitated a process of 'cognitive' Europeanization, 
through the EU's capacity-building agenda and the communication of new 'ways of 
doing things' and practises of how to organise and act as civil society. As a result, 
the post-accession cognitive Europeanization represents a slightly different picture: 
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the opportunities provided by the EU programmes perpetuate pro-EU interests 
evident in the pre-accession period (Interview, EU official D’, Nicosia 2009). 
However, now, the cognitive effect has an added ‘technical’ flavour, since the 
recipients of the EU aid have been communicated a series of new ideas and 
practises about civil society and how organisations could set-up and act. 
 
Besides, assistance of civil society lies at the heart of a series of other provisions in 
the FAR. The objective of the Regulation ‘[to bring] the community closer to the EU’ 
(European Commission 2006, article 2) has been addressed through the ‘Community 
Scholarships Programmes’ and the ‘Promotion of Youth Exchanges and other People-
to-People Contacts’ (European Commission 2009, 42.4). While the first initiative has 
benefited scholars that want to study across the EU, the latter has principally targeted 
civil society:  
 
priority [is] given to participants between twelve and thirty 
years old as well as to areas where the isolation and lack of 
awareness of the EU context is the greatest (European 
Commission 2009b, 1.2.B).   
 
Indeed, Brussels is very vocal about the effort to cultivate an EU understanding 
among the Turkish-Cypriots that is, admittedly, weak, also due to international 
isolation:  
 
the political situation and the relatively low level of prosperity [...] 
preventing indeed opportunities for contacts abroad, this community has 
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[…]limited relations with counterparts in the EU […] From this isolation 
resulted a remarkable deficit of knowledge about the EU […] It is therefore 
appropriate to enable the Turkish-Cypriots [...] to develop fruitful relations 
with other EU Member States (European Commission 2009b, 1.1).   
 
The first call for proposals for the ‘Promotion of Youth Exchanges and other People-
to-People Contacts’ in 2007 was rather unsuccessful due to lack of capacity and 
weak applications (European Commission 2009, 42.4). At the same time, many 
Turkish-Cypriot have been frustrated with the (unknown) processes of EU 
programmes (Interviews, EU Official E’ and KTTO Official, Nicosia 2009). As a 
result, in the second call for the scheme in 2009, the EU assisted locals in preparing 
their bids (European Commission 2009d) and, indeed, this round was much more 
successful, with over 85 per cent of the grants claimed (European Commission 
2010d). The low quality of applications continues to be a challenge and requires 
important consultation from the side of the Commission, whose capacity is strained 
(European Commission 2012, 10). However, this is not to undermine the fact that a 
potentially important Europeanization does take place via the empowerment of civil 
society and its gradual familiarization with a series of norms and practises of 
organisation and ideas about the EU; indeed, awarded projects, such as the ‘Study 
Visit to the European Institutions’ or ‘Networking with the EU’ are indicative of the 
EU’s effort to increase knowledge and socialization of locals in the European sphere. 
Here again, international isolation comes with a lack of EU understanding, which 
creates the conditions for a potentially important cognitive Europeanization. 
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The EP is another EU actor that engages with the Turkish-Cypriot community and 
has invested in the assistance and empowerment of civil society.  The 'High Level 
Contact Group for the Relations with the Turkish-Cypriots in the Northern Part of the 
Island' (CYTR) hopes to ‘establish contact with the […] representatives of civil 
society in the broadest sense of the term’ (CYTR 2009) and also increase the locals' 
understanding of the EU. Indeed, MEPs have met with many civil society 
representatives, most of which happen to also be beneficiaries of the EU 
programmes. CYTR activities have also seen participation of reconciliation-
orientated civil society who, however, does not represent a majority among the 
whole of the Turkish-Cypriot actors contacted. This further adds to the weakened 
linkage between support to civil society and promotion of reconciliation. In this 
regard, partners of the CYTR are offered the chance for greater participation in EU 
affairs and more information opportunities, via the EP's campaign to raise EU 
awareness. What is particularly interesting here is that contested statehood 
facilitates the process of Europeanization and a prioritization of civil society: member 
of the CYTR (MEP, interview, Brussels 2009) explains that, due to the fear of 
'recognition by implication'5, the EP has engaged more with civil society, rather than 
with officials of the contested administration. This prioritization of civil society over 
state agents is a reoccurring and interesting theme of the Turkish-Cypriot example 
as a contested state (see also below).  
 
Finally, the ‘Green Line Regulation (‘GLR’- European Council 2005) is another 
instrument which, although not fundamentally concerned with civil society, offers 
important insights into the EU’s role on the ground. The Regulation aims at 
                                                        
5 The term, often cited by EU and local elites, refers to the diplomatic recognition of the authorities of the self-
declared state, via interaction with them.  
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controlling movement of persons and goods between the two Cypriot communities 
and calls for a series of trade-related tasks to be undertaken by local agents. 
Because the EU does not recognise the self-declared state (Interview, EU Official F', 
Brussels 2009), the Commission preferred to avoid interaction with the Turkish-
Cypriot administration in fear of ‘recognition by implication’ (see above) and a series 
of trade responsibilities were instead delegated to the KTTO (European Commission 
2004). For that reason, the KTTO established a representation office in Brussels, 
which gradually evolved into an important lobbying centre for the Turkish-Cypriots 
(Interview, KTTO official, Brussels 2009). In addition, the KTTO personnel in Cyprus 
were trained by EU experts on their role in the GLR (TAIEX 2006, 9) and also on the 
implementation of the FAR and the assistance of beneficiaries (e.g. application for 
and management of grants etc-Interview, KTTO Official, Nicosia 2009).  
 
This interaction with the EU has affected the KTTO in terms of power but also 
cognitive matters. At the domestic level, the EU has provided KTTO with 
'informational advantages', since the chamber was given an important role in the 
GLR due to its expertise in trade. At the same time, KTTO has contributed to other 
EU activities, like the FAR, and leading members of the Chamber claim that their role 
as ‘facilitators’ of EU-local relations is a source of important empowerment (KTTO 
Official, Nicosia 2009). Besides, the involvement of the KTTO in EU matters has 
provided opportunities to 'exit domestic constraints' and increase the Chamber's 
participation in the international environment, as exemplified by their activity in 
Brussels and greater access to information, resources and networking (Interview, 
KTTO Official, Brussels 2009). Here, the absence of recognition of the contested 
state adds to the empowerment of the organization, which is preferred by the EU as 
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an alternative partner (Interview, ex KTTO Official, Nicosia 2009). Lastly, the EU-
provided training of Chamber members and their growing socialization at the EU 
level is indicative for the ‘cognitive’ Europeanization pressures towards a better EU 
understanding and news ideas and practises that exist beyond the Turkish-Cypriot 
space. Although the KTTO represents a unique case, the position of a non-state 
actor within a traditionally state-dominated environment is very important and offers 
a blueprint for other cases of Europeanization of contested states and the role of civil 
society in this regard. 
  
Apart from the KTTO, the rest of the moderate civil society that participated in the 
pro-solution/ EU movement (before accession) has displayed minimal interaction 
with the EU in this period. For example, only five per cent of the beneficiaries of FAR 
were part of pro-solution/ EU platforms, such as 'This is Our Country'. The EP's 
activities also see a limited partaking of this group of actors. This is due to a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the pro-solution/ EU trend among locals has declined and some 
argue that 'moderate' civil society pays the price of mounting Euroscepticism 
(Interviews, Denktas and Cakici, Nicosia 2009). Secondly, Brussels have criticised 
the over-politicization of civil society (Interviews, EU official D' and EU Official G', 
Nicosia 2009) and tried to support not just 'moderate' organizations but a variety of 
other causes (Interview, EU Official D', Nicosia 2009). Thirdly, most of the trade 
unions, which were at the epicentre of the pro-solution/EU trend, have showed 
limited engagement with Brussels possibly due to their early Euroscepticism that has 
staged a come-back after the EU accession in spite of the failed reunification 
(Interview, Ersalan, Nicosia 2009).   
 
22 
 
Not only has long-established Turkish-Cypriot civil society displayed limited 
interaction with the EU, but newly emerged organizations seem to have been the 
protagonists of EU programmes. This is, largely, a result of the EU's assistance to 
newly-founded NGOs, such as the ‘Energy Professional Association’ or the ‘Cyprus-
EU association’. Besides, the power that civil society acquired in the pre-accession 
era encouraged the appearance of new organizations, who sought the support of the 
EU towards their development. The 'birth' of new organisations, largely assisted by 
the EU, can be seen as significant not only for their empowerment but also the EU’s 
cognitive effect on actors that represent a 'blank canvas' for EU-related influences on 
how they set-up and organize their action.  
 
Consequently, the EU continues to have an important relevance to civil society but, 
throughout the years, power seems to have changed hands from old to new actors 
and the post-accession era seems a slightly different 'story' of the Europeanization of 
civil society. Before, empowerment was evident in civil society’s increased influence 
for domestic politics (as exemplified by their important role in the public debate). In 
contrast, their more recent empowerment mostly relates to the enhancement of civil 
society's capacity, through proactive financial and technical assistance from the side 
of the EU, something which distinguishes the pre-and post-accession eras and gives 
the later a clearer 'top-down' flavour of Europeanization. Indeed, EU representatives 
refer to different groups of civil society that have engaged with the programs and 
they also highlight their internal strengthening (capacity building) and consequent 
external empowerment (Interview, EU Official C, Nicosia 2009). However, it is still 
early to test whether this empowerment will lead to an increase of relevance to the 
overall socio-political landscape. This becomes especially doubtful given continuous 
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reports on the problematic implementation of the EU assistance, due to the unique 
politico-economic conditions in northern Cyprus (European Commission 2012, 10). 
Lastly, the post-accession 'cognitive' Europeanization represents a somehow 
different picture: although moderate civil society continues to support the scope of 
the EU (which is however a topic less dominant in the agenda), cognitive change 
relates more to awareness about the EU but also a series of news ideas and 
practises on how to organise and act as organisations, which are communicated to 
the EU beneficiaries. Indeed, civil society elites discuss how the EU assistance has 
made domestic organisations more professional (Interview, Erel, Nicosia 2009). 
 
Conclusion: The Europeanization of the Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society and 
Beyond 
 
This study has reflected on the EU's impact on the Turkish-Cypriot civil society and 
provided a test-case for the Europeanization of contested states. Here, the pre and 
post-accession periods represent two different phases of Turkish-Cypriot 
‘Europeanization’: until circa EU accession, mostly old 'moderate' civil society actors 
were domestically empowered and also had their interests reconfigured towards pro-
EU attitudes. To the contrary, the post-accession period did not see their power 
enhanced or their interests further impacted by the EU. This was mainly due to their 
minimal interaction with Brussels and the decline of the pro-solution/EU trend. 
Instead, EU activities have empowered a slightly different group of civil society, that 
also become subjects to cognitive pressures, via the communication of new ideas of 
organization and action and ideas about the EU. Those players are often more 
neutral against the Cyprus problem, largely ‘young’ and assisted in their 
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establishment by the EU.  Along these lines, research hypothesis is verified  and 
indeed the EU has impacted both the power and ideational dynamics of domestic 
civil society, albeit in different ways when the pre and post-accession eras are 
compared. Furthermore, the ways through which change is induced are different, 
when the two periods are compared: the pre-accession Europeanization took place 
due to the reunification /EU-integration association and in what can be seen as a 
largely 'bottom-up' fashion. In the post-accession era, the EU's effect is also 
channelled via the bilateral EU-Turkish-Cypriot relations that, although reflecting EU 
enlargement record and a clearer top-down process of Europeanization, retain their 
uniqueness due to contested statehood conditions. Below, those conditions are 
chematically categorised into three broad themes, which contribute to the 
Europeanization debate:  
 
a. The Conflict 
The conflict often related to the contested state, which can divide societies based on 
the people's stance towards solution, is expected to create additional implications for 
the EU's effect. Here, the extended Europeanization of interests of the Turkish-
Cypriot civil society relates to the linkage between a compromised solution to the 
Cyprus problem and EU integration prospects, which made ‘moderate’ actors to 
embrace the scope of the EU, often despite their initial Euroscepticism. With regard 
to power distribution, the linkage between EU integration and reunification initially 
added to the influence of moderate civil society. However, in the post-accession era 
and with pro-European attitudes diminishing, the civil society that led the pro-
solution/EU trend has lost relevance. This varied effect of the EU reconfirm previous 
observations on the power of European integration to define the influence and 
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interests of domestic actors, especially if 'tied' to existing socio-political cleavages 
(here, the form of solution to the Cyprus issue). At the same time, the Turkish-Cypriot 
example has showed how the support of the EU by domestic elites makes their 
influence dependant on the dominant attitudes towards Brussels.  
 
b. The International non-recognition  
Moreover, the absence of international recognition profoundly shapes the 
Europeanization of local civil society in conditions of contested statehood. Overall, 
the diplomatic non-recognition of TRNC on behalf of Brussels has limited the EU’s 
mission on the ground (European Commission 2012, 10). However, it has also 
magnified the EU's effect on certain civil society actors. For example, in an effort to 
avoid engagement with the contested administration, the EU found an alternative 
partner in the face of the KTTO. This role has provided the Chamber with many 
advantages, such as access to the EU environment, information and policy 
knowledge and opportunities and influence. The comparative prioritization of civil 
society does not stop in the case of the KTTO and, indeed, the EP has also been 
careful to avoid recognition claims and, naturally, communicated more with civil 
society representatives. In this regard, highly-ranked KTTO official recognises the 
consequent empowerment of civil society via a ‘people’s diplomacy’(Interview, 
Brussels 2009). This represents a remarkable feature of the Turkish-Cypriot example 
and offers important comparative value for the study of the Europeanization of 
contested states.  
 
c. The International Isolation 
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The international isolation is the last factor that mediates the domestic manifestation 
of Europeanization of contested states. Here, years of isolation have contributed to 
an underdeveloped Turkish-Cypriot civil society, which is also deeply unfamiliar with 
the EU realities. This has affected the interaction between the EU and civil society in 
two opposing ways. Firstly, the low familiarity with EU affairs has evoked a certain 
degree of Euroscepticism among locals, who stood suspicious (Interview, EU Official 
D', Nicosia 2009) and frustrated (Interview, Nami, Nicosia 2009) towards the time-
consuming process of grant application and longed for immediate benefits (Interview, 
Erel, Nicosia 2009). Secondly, due to this difference in practises, Brussels have 
launched an imperative capacity-building mission, which offers new channels for the 
EU's effect. This reconfirms the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis and suggests that the EU’s 
impact gains where the difference between domestic and EU level is significant, 
something which should be expected in contested states.  
 
In this context, the Turkish-Cypriot example has a strong comparative potential for 
the study of European integration, especially in reference to contested states and 
civil society. The article has argued that, where the EU future is linked to important 
domestic matters (especially the conflict related to the contested state), a 
redistribution of power will take place in favour of pro-EU elites (including civil 
society), where pro-European attitudes prevail, and against them where 
Euroscepticism exists. The mobilisation of the Turkish-Cypriot society in favour of 
European integration and the ability to influence domestic socio-political dynamics 
(e.g. election results) is an interesting example of a bottom-up process of 
Europeanization in contested states and indeed environments where European 
integration is seen in a very positive light.  This important role of the EU in the public 
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debate (and, therefore, the conflict per se) contradicts many works on the EU's 
limited aptitude for conflict resolution and is important for the Europeanization 
discussion in reference to both contested and conventional states. Secondly, the 
non-recognition of the contested state seems to create additional opportunities for 
civil society, often at the expense of state authorities. Again, this is a particularly 
important finding that contributes to the debate on Europeanization, not necessarily 
restricted to contested statehood: non-state actors are expected to be prioritised by 
the EU over authorities of either contested states (e.g. TRNC, Kosovo) or 
governments with which interaction is challenging due to other reasons, including 
many politically 'awkward' partners of the EU (e.g. a variety of states of the ENP). 
Thirdly, the isolation and the related international unfamiliarity of the Turkish-Cypriot 
civil society unveils the increased opportunities for the EU to influence practises, 
ideas and domestic balance of power. Indeed, this is not too dissimilar to previous 
enlargement examples (e.g. 2004/2007). It is also relevant to a series of other cases, 
where the contested legitimacy of the state (and not just contested statehood, see 
above) prohibits the development of international links. In this regard, more research 
on the topic is welcome, especially in reference to different contexts of the EU’s 
relations to contested states, such as Enlargement (e.g. Kosovo) or various partners 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (e.g.  Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh or the disputed territories in Georgia) or the Eastern 
Partnership, and how these different links shape EU instruments, mechanisms and 
the outcome of Europeanization. In this context, although particularly relevant to 
contested states, the study of the Turkish-Cypriot case contributes to the wider 
discussion on Europeanization and  the debate on the EU's external role, especially 
28 
 
in reference to alternative ways of engagement, beyond traditional state-centric 
interaction.   
 
 
References  
 
Agh, A. (1999) ‘Europeanization of Policy-Making in East Central Europe: The 
Hungarian Approach to EU Accession’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6 (5): 
pp. 839-854 
 
Anastasiou, H. (2007) ‘Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic 
Democracy: The Failure of Nationalist Leadership from the Hague Talks to the 
Cyprus Referendum’, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 190 –205 
 
BBC News (14 January 2003) Thousands Rally for a United Cyprus’, retrieved 12  
March 2013 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2656211.stm 
 
Beer, E. and Flecker, J. (1998) ‘Joining the European Union: The Reactions of 
Austrian Trade Unions’, in Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of 
National Identity, eds. Pasture, P. and Verberckmoes J., Berg, Oxford, pp. 204-215 
 
Bieber, F. (2011) 'Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU 
Membership in the Western Balkans', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 63, no 10, pp. 1783-
1802 
 
29 
 
Börzel, T. A. (2011) 'When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood The Western 
Balkans as a Test Case for the Transformative Power of Europe',  KFG Working 
Papers, No. 30  
 
Börzel, T.A., Risse, T. (2000) ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and  
Domestic Change’, European Integration Online Papers, vol 4, pp. 1-24 
 
Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000) ‘Coming to Terms with Europe: Europeanization, 
Whitehall and the Challenge of Devolution’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, 9 
 
 
Císař, O. and Vráblíková, K. (2010) ‘The Europeanization of Social Movements in 
the Czech Republic: The EU and Local Women’s Groups’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, no. 43, pp. 209-219 
 
Civil Society Support Team (2009) ‘Newsletter’, retrieved 8 March 2010, from 
http://www.siviltoplum.eu/en/21/downloads.html. 
 
Coppieters, B. Ed. (2004) Europeanization and conflict resolution: case studies from 
the European periphery, Academia Press, Gent 
 
Cowles, M. et al. (2001) ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction’, in 
Transforming Europe, ed. Cowles, M. et al., Cornell University Press, New York, pp. 
1-20  
 
30 
 
Cyprus Protests Calendar (2010)   Retrieved 3 March 2010 from 
http://protests.hamamboculeri.org 
 
Della Porta, D. and Caiani, M. Eds. (2009) Social Movements and Europeanization, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford  
 
Della Porta, D. and Caiani, M. (2007) ‘Europeanization from Below?: Social 
Movements and Europe’, An International Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-20 
 
Doob, L. W. (1986) ‘Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 30, no 2, pp. 383-396 
 
European Commission (2004) Proposal for a Council Regulation on special 
conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control 
 
European Council (2006) Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 establishing an 
instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the 
Turkish Cypriot community  
 
European Commission (2002) The Communication Strategy On Enlargement 
Progress Report 2 
 
31 
 
European Commission (2009) Annual Report on the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its 
application, COM (2009) 478 
 
European Commission (2009b) Promotion of Youth Exchanges and Other People-to-
People Contacts II, Second Call for Proposals, Europeaid/127972/C/ACT/CY 
 
European Commission (2009c) Third Annual Report 2008 on the implementation of 
Community assistance under Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 
2006  
 
European Commission (2012) Sixth Annual Report 2012 on the implementation of 
Community assistance under Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 
2006  
 
Fargion, V., Morlino, L. and Profeti, S. (2006), 'Europeanization and territorial 
representation in Italy', West European Politics, vol. 29, no 4, pp. 757 -783 
 
Faustmann, H. (2003) ‘Cypriotness in Historical Perspective’, retrieved 16 
September 2008 from http://dzforum.de/downloads/020101001.pdf 
 
Featherstone, K. (2000) 'Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: Strategic Usage, 
Structural Transformation and Institutional Adaptation', South European Society and 
Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 141 - 164 
 
32 
 
Goetz, K. H. and Meyer-Sahling, J.H. (2008) ‘The Europeanization of national 
political systems: Parliaments and executives’, Living Reviews on European 
Governance, vol. 3, no. 2 
 
Goetz, K. H. (2000) ‘European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in 
Search of an Effect?’, West European Politics , vol. 23, no 4, pp. 211-231 
 
Göksel, D. N. and Güneş, R. B. (2005), 'The Role of NGOs in the European 
Integration Process: The Turkish Experience', South European Society and Politics, 
vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 57- 72 
 
Grabbe, H.  (2001) 'How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 
6, pp. 1013 - 1031 
 
Hix, S. and Goetz, K. H. (2001) 'Introduction: European Integration and National 
Political Systems', in Europeanization Politics?: European Integration and National 
Political Systems, eds. K. H. Goetz  and S. Hix, Frank Cass, London 
 
 
Keane, J. (2009) 'Civil Society: Definitions and Approaches'. Available online at: 
http://www.johnkeane.net/pdf_docs/civil_society/jk_civil_sciety_definitions_encyclop
edia.pdf, retrieved 24 March 2009.  
 
33 
 
Kibris (12 August 2002)‘Eighty-six NGOs in occupied areas seek solution to the 
Cyprus problem by end of 2002, retrieved 3 March 2010 from 
http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-08-12.tcpr.html#01. 
 
Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002) ‘The National Impact of European Union 
Regulatory Policy:  Three Europeanization Mechanisms’, European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 41, pp. 255-280 
 
Kyris, G. (2012) ‘Europeanization and the Turkish–Cypriot Political Parties: How 
Europe Matters’, Turkish Studies, 1-17 
 
Ladrech, R. (1994) 'Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of 
France', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 32, no 1, pp. 69-88 
 
 
Latif, D. (2007) ‘The Role of the Media and Local Initiatives in the Presentation of the 
Annan Plan in North Cyprus’, in Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, ed. Kilpadi, 
P., International Policy Fellowships Open Society Institute, Budapest, pp. 122-127 
 
Lippert et al. (2001) 'Europeanization of CEE executives: EU membership 
negotiations as a shaping power', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, 
pp. 980 - 1012 
 
Loizides, N. G. (2007), ‘Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus’, International 
Studies Perspectives, vol. 8, 172–189 
34 
 
 
Loizos, P. (2006) 'Bicommunal Initiatives and their Contribution to Improved 
Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots', South European Society and 
Politics, vol. 11, no , pp. 179- 194 
 
 
Nodia, G. (2004) 'Europeanization and (not) resolving secessionist conflicts', Journal 
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 
 
 
Papadimitriou, D. and Petrov, P. (2012) ' Whose Rule, Whose Law? Contested 
statehood, external leverage and the EU’s Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, JCMS, 
vol. 50, no5, pp. 746-763 
 
Pilat, N.M. (2007) ‘Towards the Europeanization of Trade Unions in post-Communist 
Romania’, South East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 95-
107  
 
Popescu, N. (2007) 'Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, CEPS Working Document, No. 260 
 
Radaelli, C. M. (2000) ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and 
substantive change’, European Integration Online Papers,  vol.4, no 8 
 
35 
 
Secrieru, S. (2011)'The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles 
for trust building (2009–2010)', Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 1, 
no 3, pp. 241-263 
 
Seldemeier, U. (2011) ‘Europeanization in new member and candidate states’, Living  
Reviews on European Governance, vol. 6, no 1  
 
Sepos, A. (2008) The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, Policies and Politics,  
MacMillan, Basingstoke 
 
 
TAIEX (2006) Activity Report 
 
The Economist (20 July 2000). 'Turkish Cyprus: Not a Baby', retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/6632 21 June 2012 
 
Tocci, N. (2005) ‘Does EU Promote Democracy in Palestine’? in Democratisation in 
the European Neighbourhood, eds. Emerson, M. and Senem, A., Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels 
 
Tocci, N. (2008) 'The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia: Hindering 
EU Potential Through the Political Management of Contractual Relations', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 46,  no. 4, pp. 875–897 
 
36 
 
Töller, A. E. (2004) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policies – Understanding 
Idiosyncratic  
Mechanisms and Contingent Results, European Integration online Papers, vol. 8, no 
9 
 
Vachudova, M. A. (2003) ‘Strategies for Democratization and European Integration 
in the Balkans’, in The Enlargement of the European Union, ed. Cremona, M., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford,  pp. 141–160 
 
 
Williams, A. 'States, Borders and the Idea of the ''Common State'': The Case of 
Moldova, 1992–2002', International Relations, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 345–359 
 
Wolleh, O. (2002) ‘Cyprus: A Civil Society Caught Up in the Question of 
Recognition’, Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia, retrieved 1 September 
2010 from  http://www.conflict 
 
Zervakis, P. (2002)' The Europeanization of the Cyprus Question. A Model for 
Conflict Resolution?, Croatian Political Science Review, vol. XXXIX, No. 5, pp. 156–
173  
 
